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Abstract
We mathematize El Farol bar problem and transform it into a workable model. We nd general
conditions on the predictor space under which the convergence of the average attendance to the
resource level does not require any intelligence on the side of the agents. Secondly, specializing
to a particular ensemble of continuous strategies yields a model similar to the Minority Game.
Statistical physics of disordered systems allows us to derive a complete understanding of the
complex behavior of this model, on the basis of its phase diagram.
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1. Introduction
Statistical mechanics has developed powerful tools to tackle analytically disordered
systems with many degrees of freedom. These tools were recently shown to be appli-
cable to systems of inductive heterogeneous agents such as the minority game (MG)
[1–4]. Even if the latter is inspired by El Farol’s bar problem [5], the literature on
these two models are rather separate. In particular, what the MG has brought to the
understanding of the El Farol problem as dened by Arthur is not clear. Here, we
show that all results known about the MG directly apply to the El Farol problem.
In the El Farol’s bar problem, N = 100 customers have to decide independently
whether to go or not to the bar, which has a capacity of L = 60 seats, the resource
level. Attending when the bar is crowded is not enjoyable. Customers are inductive
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rational agents. They use simple predictor rules, based on the past attendances, to
predict whether the bar will be crowded or not, and behave accordingly.
One important issue is whether the customers, who do not communicate with each
other, are able to synchronize their actions so that the attendance A is on average equal
to the resource level L. The main result of Arthur is that agents need not be endowed by
a sophisticated deductive rationality in order to synchronize. Even inductively rational
agents can do. This result is probably responsible for the large interest his model
aroused [6]. Here we show that even inductive rationality is not necessary because
even zero-intelligence agents, acting as simple automation, are able to self-organize to
the comfort level. The convergence of the average attendance to the comfort level L
is trivial under very generic and reasonable conditions. The really non-trivial question
is whether agents are able or not to reduce stochastic uctuations of the attendance A
around L. The MG was introduced [1] exactly to address this question, though in a
simplied model. In what follows, by focusing on a particular ensemble of strategies for
the El Farol bar customers, we derive a model for which we can use all the machinery
used in the theory of MGs to derive a complete picture of the El Farol bar problem.
The main results are that there is an optimal complexity of the strategies which
agents should consider, depending on their number N . More precisely, for a xed
ratio ‘ = L=N of seats to agents, coordination is optimal when agents use predictor
strategies based on m≈ c log2 N values of the past attendance. If mc log2 N crowd
eects occur whereas when mc log2 N the information on past attendance is way
too redundant.
We also show the importance for the agents to use consistent predictors. On the
one hand, a small systematic bias aects considerably the results. On the other, an El
Farol problem with consistent strategies is equivalent to a MG. This implies that a
large part of literature on the latter model is also directly relevant to the study of the
former without any modication. Inconsistent strategies correspond to biased strategies,
or equivalently to a tunable resource level, in MG. Such issues were investigated
numerically in Refs. [7–9] with numerical simulations.
2. A mathematical formalism for El Farol bar problem
In Arthur’s paper, each customer uses the public knowledge of past m weeks’ atten-
dance
It = {A(t − m); A(t − m− 1); : : : ; A(t − 1)}
in order to determine whether to go to the bar, or to stay at home. She crafts a
prediction of the next attendance A(t). If her prediction is larger than the resource
level, she stays at home, else she goes to the bar. The learning procedure is inductive,
she has a personal set of S xed strategies based on S dierent attendance predic-
tors Ai;1; : : : ;Ai; S . These are functions mapping the information I about the past m
attendances to the integer prediction Ai; s(I)∈ [0; N ] of the next attendance A(t).
Each attendance predictor Ai; s s = 1; : : : ; S should not be rewarded depending on
their precision but rather on the payo they give to an agent who follows their advice.
So if A(t) = 59, a prediction of 5 is better than that of a prediction of 61. More
precisely, every predictor s has a score Ui; s associated to it, that evolves according to
Ui; s(t + 1) =Ui; s(t) +{[Ai; s(It)− L][A(t)− L]} ;
where (x) is the Heaviside function [(x) = 0 for x¡ 0 and (x) = 1 for x¿ 0],
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ai(t) ;
is the attendance at time t and ai(t) is the choice of customer i at time t, which is
determined by following her best predictor at that time. Mathematically,
si(t) = argmax
s′
Ui; s′(t)
and
ai(t) =[L−Ai; si(t)(It)] :
This is the setup of the game proposed by Arthur. 1 He did not specify what the
predictor space was, but gave only a few examples of predictors, such as the average
of the last attendance numbers A(It)=1=m
∑m
t′=1 A(t− t′), or a mirror number of the
attendance of t − 3, i.e., A(It) = L− A(t − 3). Fogel et al. [10] used auto-regressive
functions A(It) =
∑m
k=1 fkA(t − k), where fk are real numbers.
Specifying the ensemble of predictors from which agents draw strategies is a key
issue in the El Farol bar problem.
2.1. Predictors and strategies
In general, a predictor is a function from I∈ [0; N ]m to A∈ [0; N ]. There are (N +
1)(N+1)
m
dierent such functions. A strategy instead, is a function a(I) from the
set of possible informations I∈ [0; N ]m to an action a∈{0; 1}. Each strategy can be
considered as the result of the prescription of a predictor: a(It) =[L−A(It)].
However, simple counting shows that there are 2(N+1)
M
possible strategies, which
is a way smaller than the number of predictors for large N . Hence many dierent
predictors A(I) correspond to the same strategy a(It). For a particular strategy a(I)
with
∑
I a(I) =K, there are
N(a) = (N − L)KL(N+1)M−K (1)
predictors A which are consistent with that strategy.
Eq. (1) implies that not all strategies are equivalent, in principle. In order to illustrate
this point, let us consider the case of a strategy resulting from a predictor taken at
random. When N; L1, we almost surely pick a strategy which prescribes to go a
fraction L=(N +1) of times. Indeed by Eq. (1), almost all strategies have this property.
As a byproduct we see that Arthur’s result that the attendance self-organizes to the
comfort level L is trivial if agents draw predictors uniformly and at random from
the whole predictor space. The attendance self-organizes to the comfort level L for the
1 In practice one should consider a non integer L, else the system can freeze articially at A = L.
simple reason that agents following predictor strategies will attend with a probability
L=(N + 1).
Actually it is desirable to restrict the ensemble of predictors from which agents draw,
to those having some consistency and continuity properties. Consistency means that the
predictor should be consistent with past observations, for example if A(t−k) uctuates
around some value L a consistent predictor would also have A≈L. A predictor of the
Fogel type A(I) =
∑M
k=1 fkA(t − k) should be such that
∑M
k=1 fk =1, else it would
predict systematically an attendance which is larger than the true one, hence, not be
consistent.
A minimal requirement of consistency is that the resulting strategies be unbiased,
i.e., that “on average” they prescribe to attend a fraction L=(N + 1) of the times. A
mathematical formalization of this property entails non-trivial considerations and it will
not be pursued here. 2 Rather we shall later introduce explicitly the bias of strategies
as an external parameter and study the collective behavior as a function of it.
Strategies derived from a random predictor, are unbiased but fail to have a minimal
degree of “continuity”. Loosely speaking, continuity of A means that if the change
in the information I is small, the change in the prediction A(I), or at least in the
prescribed action [L−A(I)] should also be small (or rare). For example, the action
prescribed by the strategy should change only rarely when the attendance of a past day
changes by a small amount. Considering that past attendance may also be subject to
observation errors, continuity is a quite desirable robustness property of strategies.
2.2. A workable model
In the following, we focus on a particular ensemble of strategies, which is obtained
by reducing the information space. The intuition is that what is really telling about the
value of a past attendance A(t − k) is whether that was below or above the comfort
level L, which is a binary information. In other words, we consider strategies
as; i =[L−As; i(I)] ; (2)
which depend only on the information
(t) = {[L− A(t − 1)]; : : : ; [L− A(t − m)]} : (3)
Clearly, strategies derived in this way have a high degree of continuity.
Not all strategies derived by a predictor of aIs; i=[L−As; i(I)] are of the form de-
scribed above. There are only 22
M
strategies of this type, which means that a reduction
of the information space also implies a strong reduction of the strategy space. 3
The fact that agents use a strategy space whose size is independent of N makes much
sense. In context where agents interact with a crowd, their behavior is insensitive to
the exact size N of the population.
2 It is not even clear that such a formalization is possible a priori. Notice that “on average” in the
discussion above refers to a probability distribution on I which is that generated by the game’s dynamics
itself.
3 In particular, a randomly drawn A almost surely leads to a strategy which has not this form.
Henceforth, we assume that each agent is assigned S strategies randomly drawn
from this pool. More precisely, for each i; s and  we draw as; i independently from
the distribution
P(a) ≡ Prob{as; i = a}= a(a− 1) + (1− a)(a) :
As explained above, the induced strategy space of the El Farol problem is such that on
average, agents attend the bar with a frequency L=N . In other words, binary strategies
of the El Farol bar problem account a priori for the convergence of the attendance to
L on average. Hence, we shall consider below an ensemble of strategies such that the
average of as; i is a≈L=N . Actually, we shall see that small deviations of a from L=N
may have a large eect in the limit N→∞.
A further simplication, which does not change the qualitative nature of the results
[11] amounts to consider a linear dynamics of the strategy scores
Ui;s(t + 1) = Ui;s(t)− (2a(t)i; s − 1)[A(t)− L] : (4)
Note that the strategies that predict the correct choice are rewarded whereas those
prescribing a wrong choice are punished.
The understanding of the behavior of this model is made complex by the feedback
of the uctuations of A(t) with the dynamics of information (t). Note that Eq. (3) is
equivalent to assuming that (t) follows the non-linear dynamics
(t + 1) = |2(t) +[L− A(t)]|2m ; (5)
where | · · · |P is the modulus P operation. The behavior of the MG is largely unaected
if this dynamics is replaced by a random draw of (t) [12,13]. As we shall see this is
not the case in our study. Still it is very helpful to introduce a variation of the model
with random information, where (t) is just randomly drawn, with uniform probability,
from the integers 1; : : : ; P=2m (if the history is random, P can be any integer number).
This is because the model with random information can be understood in detail within
a theory such as that developed for the MG. This is a quite useful intermediate step
toward understanding the behavior of the El Farol bar problem with true information.
In addition it is also possible to quantify the eects of the dynamics of true information
Eq. (5) along the lines of Ref. [12].
In order to illustrate the behavior of the model, Fig. 1 shows the results of simulations
with L = 60, a = 1=2 and m = 2; 3; 6 (from left to right) xed as a function of N .
This shows what happens in a system where the “environment” (L) and the adaptive
capabilities of agents ( a and m) are kept xed, while the number N of agents increases.
The top graph shows the deviation 〈A〉−L of the average attendance from the comfort
level. As we see when N a≈L the attendance converges to the comfort level 〈A〉≈L.
However, for small m there is a whole interval around N a=L where agents are still able
to coordinate eciently 〈A〉≈L. For m=2, the results are qualitatively the same with
true and random information. For larger values of m the region where 〈A〉≈L shrinks.
In addition, while 〈A〉 maintains a monotonic behavior with random information, it
develops a maximum and minimum for intermediate values of aN=L beyond which the
behavior with true information markedly departs from that with random information.
〈〈
Fig. 1. Behavior of the average attendance (top) and of the uctuations (bottom) in the El Farol bar problem
with L= 60 seats, a= 1=2 and m= 2; 3 and 6 from left to right. In both cases, the solid (dotted) line refers
to true (random) information.
It is important to quantify the model’s behavior also beyond the properties of 〈A〉.
Indeed, we have seen that convergence to the comfort level is a trivial result in the
limit N→∞. It is a built-in property of the model which arises from the requirement
of unbiased strategies ( a≈L=N ).
The non-trivial cooperative behavior of this system, as forcefully remarked by the
literature on the MG, lies in how and whether agents manage to decrease uctuations
of the attendance A(t) around the comfort level L. Indeed, even if A(t) equals L on
average, the distance |A(t)−L| measures the amount of wasted resources, either unex-
ploited A(t)¡L or over-exploited A(t)¿L. Therefore, the quality of the cooperation
among agents is measured, at a ner level, by the uctuations around the resource
level, dened as
2 = 〈(A− L)2〉 ; (6)
where 〈· · ·〉 is the average on the stationary state. Given that A(t) is the sum of N
contributions, it is natural to study the quantity 2=N which, as we shall see has a
nite limit value in the limit N→∞.
The behavior of 2=N is shown in Fig. 1. Away from the point aN =L, the increase
of 2=N is mainly due to the deviation 〈A〉 − L and as before, it diers in the cases
of true and random information. For small m; 2=N displays a maximum at aN = L
which becomes shallower as m increases and it disappears for m= 6. This non-trivial
behavior suggests that a small bias in the strategies, of either sign, is benecial as it
decreases the uctuations (see also Ref. [8]).
This is evident from Fig. 2, where we compute the fraction 〈|A−L|〉=N of unsatised
agents and compare it with the behavior of agents who attend the bar at random, either
〈〈
Fig. 2. Fraction of losers in the El Farol bar problem with L=60 seats, a=1=2 and m=2 for random (♦)
and true (•) information. The results for a population of random agents who attend the bar independently
with probability a and L=N is also shown for comparison (dashed and dotted lines).
with probability a or L=N . Here we clearly see that in the region aN ≈L adaptive agents
behave less eciently than random agents. This eect is related to the emergence of
uctuations and is stronger for small values of m. Eciency increases for larger values
of m.
We shall devote the rest of this paper to explain the non-trivial behavior displayed
by 〈A〉 and 2. The rst step will be extending the analytic approach of Refs. [3,11]
to the model with random information, which is essentially equivalent to a MGs with
biased strategies and tunable resource level. Then we shall analyze the case with true
information.
3. Statistical mechanics of the El Farol bar problem with random information
Following Ref. [11], one deduces that agent i ends up playing strategy s with fre-
quency fi;s that minimizes the quantity
H =
P∑
=1
(〈A|〉 − L)2 ;
where  = Prob{(t) = }= 1=P and
〈A|〉=
N∑
i=1
S∑
si=1
fs; ias; i ;
is the average of A(t) conditional on the event (t)= . This result can be obtained in
a straightforward manner by taking the average of Eq. (4) in the stationary state, and
comparing the resulting equations with the rst-order conditions of the minimization
of H with respect to fs; i.
The function H measures the predictability in the system, i.e., the amount of useful
information about the uctuations of the attendance which is left in the signal (t).
Indeed if e.g. 〈A|〉 	= L, the signal (t) carries information which is useful to predict
whether one should attend or not to the bar when (t)= . The fact that the stationary
state corresponds to minimal H means that agents exploit to their best the system’s
predictability.
In terms of statistical mechanics, H can be considered as a Hamiltonian and its
minima can be studied with standard methods. As long as H ¿ 0, the stationary state is
unique, and the replica trick [14] gives exact results [3,4,11]. For the sake of simplicity,
we will focus on the S = 2 case (see Ref. [15] for a generalization to S ¿ 2). The
details of the calculus are of no special interest, as they mostly replicate previously
published calculations [3].
We shall consider the thermodynamic limit N→∞ with
‘ ≡ L
N
and =
P
N
xed [16]. Furthermore, in order to study the eect of a deviation of a around ‘, we
introduce the convenient parameter 	 with the equation:
a= ‘ +
√
‘(1− ‘)
P
	 (7)
and we shall consider 	 nite in the limit N→∞. As we shall see this is a non-trivial
limit. For example, the case where a − ‘≈O(1) is nite, is trivial because then
each agent uses just one strategy, that which prescribes to go more (less) often if
a¡‘( a¿‘) and there is no dynamics at all. Eq. (7) implies that we consider small
deviation of a = ‘ + O(1=
√
N ) from the correct value ‘ = L=N . Even such a small
deviation, which vanishes as N→∞, has a nite eect on the global behavior as we
shall see. At any rate, other limits can be obtained analyzing the cases where either ‘,
 or 	 vanish or diverge, in the analysis that follows.
After some routine calculations, we nd that the predictability H=N is given by
H = N
√
‘(1− ‘)
2
1 + Q(
) + 2	2=
[1 + (
)]2
(8)
and the uctuations, as long as the stationary state is unique (see later), are equal to
2 = H + N
√
‘(1− ‘)
2
[1− Q(
)] + N : (9)
In these two equations, Q and  are given by
Q(
) = 1−
√
2

e−

2=2


−
(
1− 1

2
)
erf
(

√
2
)
;
(
) =
[

erf (
=
√
2)
− 1
]−1
; (10)
whereas the parameter 
 is uniquely determined by the transcendental equation


2
− Q(
)− 1− 2	
2

= 0 (11)
as a function of  and 	. Finally,  in Eq. (9) is a term which arises from collective
uctuations and its calculation requires, in principle, a detailed theory of the stochastic
dynamics of the model (see Ref. [11]) which we shall not pursue here, but whose
importance is discussed below.
When 	=0, these equations are identical to those which describe the MG behavior.
We briey recall the resulting picture: When  is large, the system is in an informa-
tion rich phase with positive predictability H ¿ 0. The predictability H decreases as
 decreases. This can be understood by observing that, at xed P = 2M , a decrease
in  means that the number of agents increases, and hence their ability to exploit the
information. At a critical value c = 0:3374 : : : the predictability vanishes and a phase
transition to a symmetric phase with H = 0 takes place. The fact that H measures an
asymmetry in the signal means that the phase transition is related to symmetry breaking
[12]. The phase transition is signaled by the divergence of the spin susceptibility ,
which is innite in the whole symmetric phase. The stationary state is unique, inde-
pendent of initial conditions, for ¿c and these facts conspire [11] in such a way
that  ∼= 0 for ¿c. On the contrary, for ¡c, the stationary state is not unique
but it depends on the initial conditions. Then ¿ 0 can be computed within a very
accurate self-consistent approximation [11]. In particular this shows that  ˙ 1= for
small .
Therefore, the El Farol bar problem, with the strategy ensemble studied here, and
the MG have the same behavior of uctuations when 	=0, that is, when N a=L. When
	 	= 0 the picture changes in the following way: First, we observe that all quantities
depend on 	2, then it is enough to consider only the case 	¿ 0 since all conclusions
extend directly to the case 	¡ 0. When 	 is small, we still have a phase transition at
the point c(	) = erf (
c=
√
2), where →∞. The parameter 
c is the solution of
erf (
=
√
2)

2
− Q(
)− 1− 2	
2
erf (
=
√
2)
= 0 : (12)
Fig. 3 plots the phase diagram of the game. The critical line separates the asymmetric
phase (H ¿ 0) from the symmetric phase (H=0). It crosses 	=0 at c(0)=0:3374 : : :,
the critical point of the standard MG [3,4]; when 	 increases c decreases and c = 0
for 	¿ 1=
√
.
The meaning of the phase diagram is clear: Indeed, H = 0 implies 〈A〉 = L. The
symmetric phase is the region of parameters where the average attendance converges
to the omfort level. This region is also characterized by large collective uctuations
2 and by a dependence on initial conditions; in particular, the uctuations decrease if
the dierence of strategy a priori valuation increases as discussed in the MG literature
[4,11,17,18]. On the contrary, there is no equality between 〈A〉 and L in the asymmetric
phase if 	¿ 0.
These results explains the complex behavior reported in Fig. 1. Indeed as N varies
with L; a and m xed, the system follows the trajectories shown in Fig. 3. For small
=Fig. 3. Phase diagram of the El Farol bar problem. The dashed lines correspond to the trajectories of systems
with L=60; a=1=2 and m=2; : : : ; 6 as the number of agents increases (from bottom to top). The dot-dashed
line corresponds to a typical trajectory of a system with xed L; N and a¿L=N as the agents’ memory
changes.
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Fig. 4. H=N in the El Farol bar problem with true information and L = 60; a = 1=2 and m = 2; 3; 4 and 6
as a function of N . Theoretical results (full lines) fully agree with numerical simulations (symbols).
values of m these cross the symmetric phase in the region aN ≈L. Fig. 4 indeed
shows that H computed along these trajectories fully agrees with the theoretical results
(for random information). The symmetric phase is characterized by large uctuations,
mainly due to dynamic uctuations (the term ). This explains the nonmonotonic
behavior of 2 in Fig. 1 for small values of m. When m increases, the trajectory
in Fig. 3 moves toward larger values of  and, for m¿mc, it remains all in the
asymmetric phase. Then  = 0, which means that 2 displays a single minimum at
aN = L (i.e., 	= 0).
In spite of the fact that the theory is derived in a particular N→∞ limit, our results
show that it reproduces accurately results for moderately small values of N . At the same
time, it clearly predicts how the collective behavior depends on the parameters N; L; a
and m. Any “experiment” where one of these parameters is changed, corresponds to a
precise trajectory in the (; 	) phase diagram and a corresponding collective behavior.
For example, for xed m and ‘= L=N , anomalous uctuations will arise in an interval
of size 1=
√
P= 2−m=2 as a changes around ‘ along a vertical trajectory in Fig. 3. The
memory size controls uctuations. Indeed generally, as P increases, keeping all other
parameters xed, the systems moves away from the symmetric phase (see dot-dashed
line in Fig. 3).
It is precisely at the boundary of the two phases that coordination is most ecient.
This means that there is an intermediate memory length which is optimal for the
collective behavior.
4. True information
The behavior of the model with true information deviates from that with random
information because, under the dynamics Eq. (5), the space of informations is not
sampled uniformly. More precisely, if  is the probability of information  in the
stationary state, we can make this statement quantitative introducing the entropy
Sm =−
2m∑
=1
 log2 
 :
When the space of information is sampled uniformly =1=2m we nd Sm=m, whereas
Sm = 0 when only one value of  is sampled recursively. Fig. 5 shows that Sm≈m
only occurs in the region where H  0 in the corresponding model with random
information, i.e., in the symmetric phase. This is consistent, because if H =0 then the
process of Eq. (5) is a simple diusion on the so-called De Bruijn graph. We refer the
interested reader to Ref. [12] for a detailed account of this process. Here it is sucient
to observe that if 〈A | 〉= L for all , then. 4
Prob{(t + 1) = |2(t) + 1|2m}= 12 :
If this is the case, the stationary state probability  = 1=2m is uniform [12]. When
H ¿ 0, for a particular value of , we expect that L− A(t) will take more frequently
one sign or the other. Hence Eq. (5) will induce a biased diusion process on (t). In
particular, for aN ¡L, the attendance will be more often below the comfort level than
otherwise. This means that 1’s will occur more often that 0’s in Eq. (3) for (t). It is
easy to check that a systematic bias of this type, produces a distribution  which is
4 Notice that A(t) is the sum of N terms ±1, which is asymptotically symmetric around the mean.
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Fig. 5. Entropy Sm=m of the El Farol bar problem with true information and L=60; a=1=2 and m=2; 3; 4
and 6 as a function of N . Vertical lines delimit the symmetric phase of the corresponding model with random
information.
concentrated on = {111 : : :} (using the binary representation). Likewise  is peaked
on  = {000 : : :} when aN ¿L. 5
Hence outside the symmetric phase, when H ¿ 0, the process (t) acquires a bias,
which reduces the “eective number of information patterns” to a number 2Sm . In order
to understand how this changes the collective behavior of players, imagine the extreme
case Sm = 0 where for some reason, the state (t) = {000 : : :} ≡ 0 occurs for a large
number of periods. Then agents will learn how to respond optimally to this state =0.
There are N++ = a2N agents with a0i;1 = a
0
i;2 = 1. They will go anyway. There are
N−−=(1− a)2N agents with a0i;1=a0i;2=0 who will not go. The remaining 2 a(1− a)N
can decide. Agents can learn to converge to A(t)=L provided that N++6 L6N−N−−,
i.e., if
L
1− (1− a)2 6N6
L
a2
:
Furthermore, if N ¿L= a, in particular if it is close to the upper limit L= a2, the infor-
mation =0 will arise very frequently from the dynamics Eq. (5). The same argument
runs for N ¡L= a and it shows agents can coordinate quite eciently when N is close
to L=[1(1− a)2], because then the information = {111 : : :} will almost always occur.
This complex interaction between the dynamics of A(t) and (t) explains the non-
monotonic behavior of 〈A〉 − L in Fig. 1.
5 As a side remark, if Prob{(t + 1) = |2(t) + 1|2m} = p;  = pn()(1 − p)m−n(), where n() is the
number of 1 in the binary representation of , and −S(p)=m = p logp + (1− p) log(1− p).
5. Conclusions
We have presented a complete theory of the El Farol bar problem. The key issue
lies in the denition of the strategy space. First, we have shown that, for the most
general ensemble of strategies, convergence of the attendance to the comfort level is
a trivial consequence of the law of large numbers. It does not even require inductive
rationality. Even zero-intelligent agents are able to reach it. This is likely to be true
for any reasonable predictor based strategy, in particular for unbiased ones.
We further focus attention on a particular ensemble of strategies, with a desirable
continuity property. This leads us to study models very similar to the Minority game.
We rst introduce the random information version of the game, for which statistical
physics provides a complete theoretical understanding and analyze the consequences of
the dynamics of true information.
It turns out that as the parameter of the El Farol bar problem change, the system
performs a trajectory on a phase diagram characterized by a symmetric phase where
〈A〉= L and a phase where 〈A〉 	= L. Deep in the symmetric phase, anomalous uctu-
ations similar to crowd eects, develop making the coordination of agents even worse
than that of random agents in some cases. It is precisely close to the phase boundary
that agents manage to coordinate most eciently. This, however, requires a small bias
of either sign, in the strategies of agents.
These ndings not only conrm that the El Farol bar problem is indeed a quite
interesting complex system. But they also show that a coherent understanding of its
behavior is possible, using tools of statistical physics.
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